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The New York-New Jersey Boundary Controversy: John Marshall and the
Nullification Crisis
Abstract

In 1832 a long-standing boundary dispute between New York and New Jersey complicated the work of Chief
Justice John Marshall and President Andrew Jackson. Long reviled by southern states' rights advocates,
including the president, Marshall in 1832 faced the prospect of having the Court's decisions ignored by the
state of Georgia. Federal authority was further challenged in the fall of 1832, when South Carolina nullified
the tariff of 1828, thereby provoking a constitutional crisis. On December 10, 1832, to the amazement of
many observers, Jackson issued a proclamation rejecting nullification and secession, and threatening military
action if South Carolina did not change its course.
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In 1832 a long-standing boundary dispute between New York and
New Jersey complicated the work of Chief Justice John Marshall and
President Andrew Jackson. Long reviled by southern states' rights
advocates, including the president, Marshall in 1832 faced the prospect
of having the Court's decisions ignored by the state of Georgia. Federal
authority was further challenged in the fall of 1832, when South
Carolina nullified the tariff of 1828, thereby provoking a constitutional
crisis. On December 10, 1832, to the amazement of many observers,
Jackson issued a proclamation rejecting nullification and secession, and
threatening military action if South Carolina did not change its
course.1
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Richard E. Ellis, The Unionat Risk:JacksonianDemocracy,
States'Rights,and the
NullificationCrisis(New York 1987), and William W. Freehling, Preludeto Civil War:The
in SouthCarolina,1816-1836 (New York 1965), are the two best,
NullificationControversy
albeit competing, comprehensive accounts of the nullification crisis. For a vivid
delineation of the crisis from Jackson's viewpoint, see Robert V. Remini, Andrew
Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845 (New York 1984), chs. 2-3.
Important works that frame their interpretations independently of Ellis but nonetheless
share Ellis's emphasis on the ambiguous outcome of the crisis include Merrill D.
Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword. The Compromiseof 1833 (Baton Rouge 1982), esp. ch.
4; and Harry L. Watson, Libertyand Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America(New York
1990), esp. 128-131.
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During the winter of 1832-1833, as Jackson attempted to crush
South Carolina's "treason," his political allies labored behind the
scenes to insure that Georgia's concurrent challenge to the Marshall
Court would not undercut the president's position. Ironically enough,
some of the same people who sought to defuse the Cherokee crisis,
including Vice President elect Martin Van Buren, were identified with
a legal position in a case pending before the Court that echoed
Georgia's position in the Cherokee cases.2 That case involved a longstanding argument between New York and neighboring New Jersey
over boundaries and possession of Staten Island. Quite unexpectedly to
all parties concerned, the New York-New Jersey suit became enmeshed
in a complex political and constitutional showdown. It had potentially
disastrous implications for the Jacksonian political coalition and
threatened the president's ability to enforce federal law in South
Carolina.
Resolving the New York-New Jersey controversy quickly became a
necessary quest of leading New York Jacksonians. By compromising
the boundary question at the same time that they sidetracked a
confrontation between Georgia and the federal
constitutional
government, Van Buren and his allies helped clear the field for a tariff
compromise that was grudgingly accepted by all parties. The
nullification crisis ended, if not on a note of high triumph for Andrew
Jackson, at least with federal authority and presidential prestige intact.3

2
For a recent reassessment of Georgia and the Cherokees, see Mary Young,
"The Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia," Journalof the EarlyRepublic,10
v.
(Spring 1990), 43-63. Edwin A. Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision: Worcester
History,39 (Nov. 1973), 519Georgiaand the Nullification Crisis," Journalof Southern
544, offers a penetrating analysis of the Jackson administration's efforts to avoid a
confrontationbetween'Georgiaand federalauthority. See Ellis, Unionat Risk, ch. 7.
3
Until recently, most scholars portrayed the nullification crisis as a Jacksonian
triumph. But as Richard Ellis argued in his important revisionist study, Jackson's
"victory" over the nullificationistswas largely illusory. The president's nationalismdid
not rally all Democrats to his banner. Moreover, the legislative compromisethat ended
the crisis left nullifiers "secure and unrepentant," and states' rights theory became
"fatefullyentwined with the concepts of slavery and secession." Ellis, Unionat Risk, ix.
Ellis's argument earned widely favorable reviews, including one from Jackson
biographerRobert Remini, despite the fact that in key respects Ellis was reviving and
expanding arguments originally made in 1949 by Charles M. Wiltse in his highly
sympathetic Calhoun biography, John C. Calhoun.Nullifier, 1829-1839 (Indianapolis
1949), chs. 13-15. For Remini's positive assessment of Ellis, see Civil WarHistory,34
(Mar. 1988), 84-86.
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The boundary dispute had deep roots in colonial history. It was made
more difficult by the extraordinary vagueness of early crown grants
and the simple fact that, at bottom, "no one knew where the New
Jersey-New York border was.'4 New Jersey had originally been part of
the grant given to James, Duke of York, by his brother Charles II in
1664, embracing also the larger jurisdiction of New York. James soon
thereafter conveyed his stake in New Jersey to two friends and
supporters, Sir George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley. Exactly what
James had granted to Carteret and Berkeley was from the beginning a
matter of dispute. Had he granted the power of government along with
control over land? Did the grant include the largely uninhabited Staten
Island, and other, smaller islands that hugged the Jersey shoreline?
What did James mean by setting the northwestern boundary between
the two colonies at 41 ?40' of latitude and the northernmost branch of
the Delaware River? (Later survey work demonstrated that these were
in fact two different places.) What did James mean by the Hudson
River as the dividing line between New York and New Jersey? Did the
Hudson River encompass the Arthur Kill, between mainland New
Jersey and Staten Island?5
Sharp disagreements on these questions bedeviled the two
jurisdictions for one hundred and fifty years. With its wealth and
population advantage, New York held the strong hand in the dispute,
essentially daring New Jersey to deny its claims to the high water mark
on the Jersey shore, to build wharves and issue summons up to that
point, to regulate commerce on the Hudson south into the Arthur Kill
that separated Staten Island from the mainland, and to hold on to
several islands that, from any logical map construction, should have
been part of New Jersey rather than New York.
Throughout the eighteenth century, lackluster negotiations
alternated with unneighborly behavior between New York and New
Jersey. Conflicts continued into the 1830s. New Jersey became
increasingly assertive after 1800, as it resisted New York's grant of a
steamboat monopoly to the Fulton-Livingston interest, and on three
to resolve the outstanding
initiated commissions
occasions
disagreements over Staten Island and related boundary disagreements.
4
Philip J. Schwarz, The Jarring Interests:New York'sBoundaryMakers, 1664-1776
(Albany, N.Y. 1979), 81.
5
Material from this and subsequent paragraphs are derived from Michael J.
Birkner, "State Wrongs and States' Rights: The New York/New Jersey Boundary
Controversy," unpublished paper delivered at the Seminar on New Jersey History,
Princeton University, March 29, 1989.

This content downloaded from 138.234.153.138 on Wed, 26 Jun 2013 11:51:46 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY CONTROVERSY

199

None of these efforts yielded a satisfactory settlement, primarily
because New York was uninterested in compromise and felt no
pressing need to assuage the smaller state. When New Jersey
attempted to involve the federal government in the controversy,
through congressional mediation, and indirectly in a steamboat case
that in 1824 set an important legal precedent, the results were mixed.
In Gibbonsv. Ogden, rooted in New Jersey's opposition to a New York
steamboat monopoly on the Hudson, the Marshall Court quashed New
York's claims to control interstate commerce. But the case had no
bearing on outstanding boundary questions between the two states.6
Congress, moreover, refused New Jersey's bid for intervention on
behalf of a boundary settlement.7
At least one historian, Herbert Johnson, has recognized the
connection between New York's "exaggerated" notions of its own
sovereignty in its general relations with New Jersey and the specific
points surrounding the steamboat case. Although New York
infrequently acted on its formal claims to sovereignty up to the high
water mark on the New Jersey shore, it continued to assert them in
negotiations and various public forums. New York also occasionally
aggravated New Jersey sensibilities by its expansive interpretation of
oystering rights on the Jersey shore and occasional assertions of police
power in the smaller state. Such aggressiveness, Johnson has argued,
"would not long be tolerated in a federal union." John Marshall's
famous opinion in Gibbonsv. Ogden, in this context, was not simply the
resolution of a federal-state conflict, but also was intended to
6

Many sources trace the origins of the two states' steamboat rivalry, which led
ultimately to the Marshall Court's influential decision in Gibbonsv. Ogden. Two recent
accounts of the controversy's early stages are Michael Birkner, "Samuel L. Southard
and the Origins of Gibbons v. Ogden," Princeton UniversityLibrary Chronicle,40 (Winter
1979), 171-182; and Herbert A. Johnson, "Gibbons v. Ogden Before Marshall," in
Courtsand Law in Early New York:SelectedEssays, ed. Leo Hershkowitz and Milton M.
Klein (Port Washington, N.Y. 1978), 105-113.
7 Details on New Jersey's bid to involve
Congress are recounted in Michael
Birkner, Samuel L. Southard:Jeffersonian Whig (Rutherford, N.J. 1984), 56; and Annals of
Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., 390, 394. A copy of New Jersey Senator Mahlon
Dickerson's bill, introduced in the Senate on January 10, 1822, is in the Samuel L.
Southard Papers (Manuscript Department, Firestone Library, Princeton University).
New York's states' rights position in the 1822 Congressional debate and
subsequently
in legal briefs marked a shift from its proclivity in the late eighteenth century to appeal
in disputes with neighboring states to higher authority. See Peter S. Onuf, The Origins
of the Federal Republic. Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787
(Philadelphia 1983), 108-109. Onuf does not discuss New York's boundary disputes
with New Jersey.
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"eliminate the likelihood of interstate clashes based upon excessively
optimistic assessments of state political powers over navigable waters."8
Gibbons v. Ogden, however, did nothing to relieve New Jersey's
distress over New York's refusal to resolve boundary and related
controversies. On several occasions, following disputes over actions of
New York constables serving process or making arrests across state
lines, New Jersey's remonstrances provoked formal negotiations. In
1807, 1826, and again in 1828, commissioners appointed by the
governors of the two states met and discussed the eastern boundary
question, without reaching any mutually agreeable compromise. The
New Yorkers refused to renounce or ease their claims to the high water
mark on the New Jersey shore, including, as the New Jersey
commissioners noted in 1807, "shores, roads, and harbors entirely
within the natural territorial limits of New Jersey." Nor would the
New Jersey delegations abandon their state's claim to jurisdiction up to
the midway point of waters conjoining the two states.9
In the wake of several border incidents and yet another failed
negotiation with New York in 1828, Jersey officials reached the end of
their patience. In the summer of 1828, New Jersey Governor Isaac
Williamson authorized state Attorney General Theodore Frelinghuysen
to bring a bill of complaint against New York before the United States
Supreme Court, requiring that New York appear before the Court in
equity proceedings.10 Frelinghuysen did some of this work, but in late
January 1829 was elected to the United States Senate, after which time
he became a secondary figure in the suit.
8
Johnson, "Gibbons v. OgdenBefore Marshall," 112.
9
Between GovernorClinton
Report of the [New Jersey] Committeeon the Correspondence
and Governor Williamson Touching the Arrest of a Ministerial Officer, of New-York ...
(Trenton, N.J. 1826), 3. Copies of background material used by the New York
Commissioners in the 1807 negotiations are in New York Boundary Papers (New-York
Historical Society, New York City), vol. 4. For a summary of New Jersey's efforts in
1806-1807, 1818, and 1826-1827 to reach some accommodation with New York on the
boundary issue, see William A. Whitehead, "Eastern Boundary of New Jersey: A
Review of a Paper on the Waters of New Jersey, Read Before the Historical Society of
New York, by the Hon. John Cochrane, and a Rejoinder to the Reply of 'A Member
of the New York Historical Society'," Proceedingsof the New Jersey Historical Society, 10
(1865), 108-110.
10
See, for example, John Rutherfurd to Richard Stockton, Sept. 24, 1827, in
Papers Referring to the Negotiations in 1827 (New Jersey Historical Society, Newark).
Also see Gov. Williamson, "Special Message to the Legislature," Feb. 1828, Southard
Papers. For New York's position, see "Report of the Commissioners of New York,
Relative to the Boundary Line Between This State and the State of New Jersey," Jan.
26, 1828, New York Senate Document no. 74. See also Rutherfurd, "Memo on the
Boundary Dispute," [1827], Southard Papers. A printed copy of Frelinghuysen's brief,
which includes a long historical analysis of New Jersey's claims to the middle of the
waters between the two states, is available, untitled, in the Southard Papers.
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Frelinghuysen's successor as attorney general, Samuel L. Southard,
soon called on his colleague in the cabinets of James Monroe and John
Quincy Adams, William Wirt of Maryland, to assume the major
responsibility for the New Jersey case. Not merely a first rate litigator,
Wirt would later become engaged in two prominent Georgia cases
before the Supreme Court--Worcester v. Georgiaand CherokeeNation v.
Georgia-that raised legal issues nearly identical to those in the New
York-New Jersey dispute.'1 If New Jersey was serious about its claims,
Southard believed, Wirt was the ideal person to argue their merits
before the Marshall Supreme Court. Wirt accepted Southard's
invitation.
Like Frelinghuysen, Wirt based his argument on the twenty-fifth
section of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which provided that the Court could
resolve jurisdictional disputes between states. New York authorities,
however, refused to participate in the suit; they even deliberately
avoided subpoenas served by representatives of the New Jersey
attorney general. When the subpoenas were finally served by a New
Jersey marshall, after a sustained and often frustrating effort, New
York's attorney general, Greene C. Bronson, declined to honor it on
the grounds that the United States Supreme Court had no jurisdiction
to hear the case.12
Such intransigence did not deter Southard or Wirt, who believed
that the larger state's defiance would spur the Court to order New
York's appearance. If New York remained obdurate, the Court could
issue a decree ex parte, a point Southard made to New York Governor
Enos Throop and Attorney General Bronson early in 1830.13 In his
correspondence with the New York officials, Southard made no overt

" Marvin R. Cain, "William Wirt Against Andrew Jackson: Reflections on An
Era," Mid-America, 47 (Apr. 1965), 122-123. Wirt was retained as counsel for New
Jersey while still attorney general of the United States. On this, see Wirt to Southard,
Feb. 8, 1832, Southard Papers.
12 Samuel Southard's
correspondence between 1829 and 1831 includes many
letters and documents relating to efforts to serve a legally binding subpoena on the New
York attorney general and other Empire State officials. See particularly correspondence
between Southard and Wirt, Southard and Supreme Court clerk William Carroll, and
Southard and New York Marshall J.W. Livingston in 1829 and 1830, Southard
Papers. On the attempts by New York attorney general to evade subpoenas, see the
papers cited above, and Ellis, Union At Risk, 144. Bronson's argument may be found in
printed form in Box 139, Southard Papers. See also the precis of his argument as of
early 1832, "Points for the Defendant," ibid.
13 Southard to Enos
Throop and Greene C. Bronson, Jan. 12, 1830, Southard
Additional Papers.
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mention of the Supreme Court's current composition,
which
New
would
favor
New
York's
presumably
Jersey's position against
firm states' rights assertions, nor of a well-set precedent for acceptance
of the Court's role as arbiter in federal-state disputes. But surely
Southard had such matters in mind as he wrote to Throop and
Bronson, and almost as certain he assumed the New Yorkers did, too.14
If Throop and Bronson were intimidated by Southard's actions,
they well disguised it. When Southard and Wirt appeared before the
Supreme Court on March 6, 1830, New York sent no opposing
counsel. Bronson had earlier written to Chief Justice John Marshall
arguing that the Supreme Court should not and could not interfere in
'"controversies between two or more states." Marshall rejected this
New York's
reasoning, and issued a subpoena commanding
show
Yorkers
failed
to
the
New
When
up in court for a
participation.
second time in January 1831, Wirt requested that the case be heard
without New York's participation. Marshall granted the request for an
ex parteproceeding, thereby lending the case a new significance as a test
of wills between a powerful state and the Marshall Court at the very
moment the Court was moving to reject Georgia's assertions of state
sovereignty in its efforts to evict the Cherokee Indians from its
borders.15
Despite the New Yorkers' rejection of Court jurisdiction in the
boundary controversy, they did eventually participate in New Jersey v.
New York,if only to emphasize their states' rights position. In the first
week of March 1832, Attorney General Bronson was joined in
Washington by another leader of the Albany Regency, Benjamin F.
Butler. Both men were prepared to insist that the Court had no
standing in the case. Such a position was strikingly similar to that
made by Georgia's counsel in Worcesterv. Georgia, which was argued
before the Marshall Court only days earlier, and decided by the Court
on March 3, just as Bronson and Butler arrived in the capital.16
14
For an authoritative account of the Marshall Court's views on sovereignty
issues, see G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (New
York 1988), ch. 8. Relevant here is John R. Schmidhauser, "'States' Rights' and the
Origins of the Supreme Court's Power as Arbiter in Federal-State Relations," Wayne
Law Review, 4 (Spring 1958), 101-114.
15 White, Marshall Court, 703-740. See also Ellis, Union At Risk, 102-122, passim;
and New Jersey v. New York, 4 Peters 284 (1831). For New York State as an "energetic
and forceful" proponent of states' rights in the early 1830s, see Ellis, Union at Risk,
144-145. Ellis discusses New Jersey v. New York only briefly, but his treatment
illuminates the difficulties facing the Marshall Court at this time.
16
Worcesterfocused on a Georgia law of 1830 that prohibited white men from
entering Cherokee territory after March 1, 1831 without a state license. The Marshall
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Andrew Jackson had made clear his sympathies for Georgia's
position in relation to the Cherokees, and had left more than one
member of the Supreme Court unsure whether he would sustain any
decree against Georgia that the Court might issue. New York's official
position in 1832, in this context, was easy to read: Why not put John
Marshall in the position of rendering a verdict that yet another
important state might choose to ignore?17 With New York following
Georgia's lead in challenging the Court, the constitutional climate in
the United States appeared unfavorable for nationalist-minded citizens.
Working on parallel tracks, it seemed likely that New York and
Georgia would frustrate John Marshall's jurisprudence and revive the
doctrine of sovereign states. That the nullification crisis would put such
an aggressive strategy in disrepute with Andrew Jackson could not
have been foreseen.
Political considerations were not lost on the sagacious chief justice.
Although it is impossible to know what Marshall was thinking as
counsel for New York and New Jersey reached Washington, the record
shows that he surprised New Jersey's lawyers, Southard and Wirt.
Marshall did not affirm their position; indeed, he declined even to hear
it. On the morning of March 14, following Bronson's day-long
argument against the Court's jurisdiction, and before Wirt had a
chance to make his argument (with which Marshall would be familiar,
since he had heard Wirt present a version of it in Worcesterv. Georgia),
Marshall announced that "the court saw that the cause could not be
decided this term, if the argument was completed, & that they had
therefore come to the conclusion that the argument should be
postponed" until February 1833.18

Court held this statute unconstitutional, a decision Georgia showed no signs of
accepting. See Bronson's argument cited in n. 12; Joseph C. Burke, "The Cherokee
Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality," StanfordLaw Review, 21 (Feb. 1969),
500-531; and Anton-Hermann Chroust, "Did President Jackson Actually Threaten the
Supreme Court of the United States with Nonenforcement of Its Injunction Against the
State of Georgia?" The AmericanJournal of Legal History, 4 (1960), 76-78. Robert V.
Remini, AndrewJackson and the Courseof AmericanFreedom,1822-1832 (New York 1981),
276-278, argues that Jackson acted with great discretion in response to Marshall's
decision in Worcesterv. Georgia,but concedes that the president "encouraged Georgia in
its intransigence." For a similar argument, See Ellis, Union at Risk, 32.
17 Marshall's discomfort at this
time is captured in Charles Warren, The Supreme
Courtin United States History (1922; rev. ed., 2 vols., Boston 1926), I, 769-772. See also
White, The Marshall Court, 959-996.
18 New
Jersey v. New York,3 Peters 461 (1830), 5 Peters 284 (1831).
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Why Marshall acted as he did remains a matter of doubt. At least
one contemporary newspaper opinion-writer believed that the chief
justice was affected by the compelling nature of Bronson's argument.
"I understand from good authority," an anonymous correspondent for
the New York Courierwrote, "that the array of names and authorities
in favor of the ground assumed by the Attorney-General of New York,
startled, in no small degree, the Supreme Bench, particularly the Chief
Justice."'9 Bronson had claimed, consistent with earlier arguments,
that the Court had no jurisdiction in this case, observing that Congress
had not furnished "the means by which the judicial power shall be
carried into execution." He added that the New York-New Jersey
boundary dispute was at bottom political, not judicial, in its nature.20
There was nothing especially compelling in Bronson's argument.
The Courierpiece to the contrary notwithstanding, John Marshall was
probably less impressed by the quality of Bronson's presentation than
by the force with which New York was expressing a hard-edged states'
rights position, barely a week after Marshall had pronounced Georgia's
position in Worcesterv. Georgza to be constitutionally untenable.21
Timing and substance, not brilliance on the part of New York's
counsel, brought the chief justice up short. The Georgia and New York
cases threatened the Court's standing because there was no likelihood
that either Georgia or New York would voluntarily submit to an
adverse ruling by the Court-or for that matter, that President Jackson
could require them to do so. In what appears to have been a thinly
veiled allusion to these cases, Marshall wrote his friend Joseph Story in
September 1832 that he had become convinced that the Constitution
"6cannot last." Not only were southern states challenging :federal

19 For Butler's
participation in and view of the case, see William D. Driscoll,
BenjaminF. Butler: Lawyer and RegencyPolitician (New York 1987), 220-226 (quotation at
225). Based on a comparison of Butler's letters to his wife and the argument in the
Courier, Butler himself may have written and planted that piece. Whether that is the
case or not, not everyone saw Bronson's argument as powerful. William Wirt, for
example, dismissed it as claptrap. He told his co-counsel, Samuel Southard, that had
he had the chance to rebut Bronson, he "would have demolished him." Wirt to
Southard, May 29, 1833, Southard Papers.
20 Bronson and
Butler, "Points for the Defendant."
21
On the legal and political complications caused by Georgia's emphatic states'
rights position in the Cherokee cases, the best analysis is that of Edwin Miles. He
points out that because of technicalities inherent in administering cases like Worcesterv.
Georgia,in 1832 the Court could not assure immediate compliance with its judgment in
favor of Worcester and his Indian allies; Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision,"
527-530. See also Burke, "The Cherokee Cases," 529-530.

This content downloaded from 138.234.153.138 on Wed, 26 Jun 2013 11:51:46 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY CONTROVERSY

205

jurisdiction on crucial issues, but the North was not nearly so united
against both states as Marshall had long assumed. "I had supposed,"
he wrote, "that North of the Potomack a firm and solid government
competent to the security of rational liberty might be preserved. Even
that now seems doubtful ....
The Union has been prolonged thus far
I
miracles.
fear
cannot
continue."22
by
they
In this context, it seems fair to speculate that Marshall's decision to
postpone the New York-New Jersey case lay in hopes, however feeble,
that respect for the Court might somehow be more vibrant in 1833
than it was in 1832. All he could expect with a judgment against New
York at this time was New York's emphatic refusal to comply-which
of course would strengthen Georgia's own determination to resist the
Court's directives. It is even possible, as James Brown Scott has
argued, that Marshall feared a strong opinion against New York would
provoke "a further amendment to the Constitution withdrawing the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such cases, as happened in the
case of suits by individuals against the states."23 Such a proposal had
been introduced by southern members of the House of Representatives
in 1830, and had been endorsed by the House Judiciary Committee,
before being defeated in the full House in January 1831.24 A year later
Marshall had every reason to believe the idea was more dormant than
dead. Whatever Marshall's reasoning in postponing the New YorkNew Jersey case, two facts stood: first, a nationalist interpretation of
the Constitution faced serious challenges; and second, the two northern
states were not an inch closer to settling their long-standing dispute.
The impasse between New York and New Jersey might have
continued but for a strange coincidence. In June, 1832, several months
22
Marshall to Joseph Story, Sept. 22, 1832, quoted in Warren, SupremeCourt,I,
769. Benjamin Butler's opinion on the matter overlappedthe two approaches.In letters
written to his wife Harriet, Butler consistently emphasized the force of Bronson's
argument; but he also suggested that Marshall had postponed the case because,
v. Georgia,he did not wish
recognizing that the South rejected his decision in Worcester
to risk provoking a new attack on the Court, this one from a powerful northern state.
See Butler to Harriet Butler, Mar. 3, 14, 1832, Benjamin Butler Papers (New York
State Library, Albany, N.Y.).
23 James Brown Scott, JudicialSettlement
BetweenStatesof theAmerican
of Controversies
Union.An Analysisof CasesDecidedin theSupremeCourtof the UnitedStates(Oxford, Eng.
1919), 116. Burke, "Cherokee Cases," 530-531, argues that Marshall was mainly
concerned to sustain the integrity and prestige of the Court.
24 "The Committee on the
Judiciary . . . to Inquire into the Expediency of
Repealing or Modifying the Twenty-Fifth Section . . .," HouseReports,21st Cong., 2d
sess., no. 43; Thomas Hart Benton, Abridgment
of theDebatesof Congress,From1789 to
1856 (16 vols., New York 1857-1861), XI, 300-302, 304-305.
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after Marshall put the boundary case in legal limbo, one of New
in the failed 1828 negotiation,
John
Jersey's representatives
was
Rutherfurd,
traveling by steamboat to Albany when he espied
New York's Benjamin F. Butler, co-counsel for his state in the
Supreme Court proceeding. In a letter to Democratic Governor Peter
D. Vroom, Rutherfurd discussed what transpired:
Mr. B[utler] began [our conversation]regrettingthe existence of the
controversy, and especially his great desire that an amicable
settlement should take place. I of course accorded with these
sentiments when he stated that if the least intimation was made by
Gov[ernor] Vroom in a letter to Gov[ernor] Throop of a desire for
an amicable settlement that he was confident Gov[ernor] T[hroop]
would make a communication to the legislature of the state which
would be in session in a few days, and that a law would immediately
pass appointing commissionersto confer with others to be appointed
by New Jersey for an adjustmentof all unsettled matters ....
Rutherfurd had responded favorably to these remarks, but he made no
promises about what New Jersey would do if New York, as Butler
suggested, agreed to appoint yet another commission to negotiate with
New Jersey. On his return home, Rutherfurd told Vroom about the
and offered a little advice. "It would be more
conversation,
for
us," he wrote, "to decline any proposition, for an
advantageous
after we had an opportunity of spreading our
until
accommodation,
case of ancient boundary before the public, and stating the hardships
and injustice N[ew] Jersey had sustained while a proprietary and
colonial government . . . thus interesting the public in our favour." At
the same time, he noted that Butler was next to Martin Van Buren
"the most influential man" in the New York Democratic party. With
Van Buren in Washington, Rutherfurd wrote, Butler was the person to
deal with if Vroom wished to see movement on this matter.25
Vroom immediately wrote to Rutherfurd expressing his thanks. He
then contacted Attorney General Southard, to whom he sent a copy of
Rutherfurd's letter. What, Vroom asked, did Southard think?26
Southard proved open-minded, if not optimistic, about a settlement.
25 Rutherfurd to
Vroom, June 10, 1832, Southard Papers. Governor Vroom
evidently passed the letter on to Southardwho, as attorney general, was responsiblefor
the state's lawsuit against New York. It should be noted that Butler's friendly private
communication contrasted sharply with a strong states' rights slant in public speeches
he made in the fall of 1832. Driscoll, Butler,226-227.
26
Vroom to Southard,June 25, 1832, SouthardPapers.
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His main concern, as expressed to Vroom, was that New Jersey not be
in the position of making the first move. "I do not well see," he wrote
to Vroom, "how you could make a communication on the subject. We
have always, heretofore, been the applying party-and have not always
been very courteously answered. All our efforts at accommodation
have failed. N[ew] Y[ork] knows perfectly well that we are . . . anxious
to meet her in the way of compromise, and I see no appearance in any
public act that she has the same disposition." Southard added: "We
were drivento our suit-and every effort on [New York's] part has been
made to procrastinate & baffle us. In our present situation, therefore, I
do not see how you can apply-but
if N[ew] Y[ork] wishes to
without
loss
can,
compromise-she
of feeling or interestof any kind, make
the offer to us." Southard then explained the procedure by which this
could be accomplished-namely,
some formal communication from a
New York official addressed either to him or to Vroom.27
When Vroom followed Southard's advice, New York Jacksonians
proved ready to respond in kind. Butler had apparently been speaking
only for himself when he told Rutherfurd he was interested in meeting
New Jersey halfway. But with the end of the presidential election
campaign in early November, and the firebell of South Carolina's
nullification doctrine ringing loudly in Jacksonian ears, there was more
incentive to settle the dispute with New Jersey. Michael Hoffmann, a
congressman from Herkimer and stalwart Regency politician, made
this point to Martin Van Buren. It was, he told Van Buren on
November 12, 1832, "of great importance" to "secure the good will of
New Jersey towards the state of New York." Hoffmann said he did not
expect New York to win the suit presently before the Supreme Court.
But "while the bill [in court] is pending and the question of jurisdiction
is undecided, there is hope-and now is our time to settle the dispute."
Van Buren, he said, should speak to Governor-elect William Marcy
and find a "mode" to bring the case to an amicable close.28
Hoffmann's letter is the only extant document that directly
expresses Regency leaders' anxiety over their dispute with New Jersey,
and even it does not tie New York's desire for a settlement directly to
the problem of nullification. It seems logical, however, to make that
connection.
Martin Van Buren was a canny politician. The
nullification crisis with South Carolina threatened the Jacksonian

27

Southard to Vroom, June 28, 1832, ibid.
Hoffmann to Van Buren, Nov. 12, 1832, Martin Van Buren Papers (Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
28
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coalition and it threatened Van Buren's standing in the South for 1836
should he speak out against Calhoun and his allies. The situation
became especially alarming in light of President Jackson's forceful
antinullification proclamation of December 10. As vice president elect,
Martin Van Buren owed fealty to Jackson; but Van Buren also
believed that strict construction of the Constitution and Jackson's
to mention his fear
current pronouncements were incompatible-not
that Virginia might well side with the nullifiers if push came to shove.29
Consequently, as Van Buren and his political allies worked to
defuse the Cherokee Crisis in Georgia, he evidently told Governor-elect
William L. Marcy in Albany that the New Jersey case had to be
resolved as soon as possible, out of court. Van Buren doubtless hoped
to get things moving before the end of the year, while Jacksonians still
controlled the machinery of government in New Jersey. But he was
prepared to move for a compromise regardless of who held power in
that state.30
Subsequently, in his first message to the legislature, Marcy
formally announced on January 2, 1833, that "the interests of both
states" would better be served by a privately negotiated compromise
than by protracted legal action.31 This was followed by Marcy's
promise of a good-faith effort by New York to resolve all pending
issues. Nine days later, William Wirt addressed a long, confidential
letter to Governor-elect Southard explaining why New Jersey should
accept this overture-a letter that in critical respects mirrored Michael
Hoffmann's recent letter to Van Buren in its pessimistic assessment of
the Court's likely disposition of the boundary dispute.
But why should New Jersey now compromise, given that the
Supreme Court had been consistently unsympathetic to states' rights

See Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision," 535-537; Donald B. Cole,
Martin Van Buren and theAmericanPolitical System(Princeton 1984), 238-240; and Richard
B. Latner, The Presidencyof AndrewJackson. White House Politics, 1829-1837 (Athens, Ga.
1979), 152-154.
30 For the Georgia-New Jersey connection, see Ellis, Union at Risk, 149-150. The
absence of a paper trail from Van Buren is unsurprising, given that Van Buren was in
Albany for much of the fall of 1832, and consequently was in a position to
communicate personally with Marcy (who was occasionally in the capital after the
elections) and leading members of the legislature.
1823-1842 (Albany,
31 Charles Z. Lincoln, comp., MessagesFrom the Governors...
N.Y. 1909), 422-424. Benjamin Butler followed up on the governor's message by
New York would
Governor of New Jersey-that
writing privately to Southard-now
be willing to negotiate seriously if New Jersey agreed to postpone any court proceeding
for one year. Butler to Southard, Jan. 3, 1833, Southard Papers.
29
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views such as New York was taking in this controversy? The answer
lay less in the politics of nullification or the Court's current posture
than Wirt's sober assessment of the future composition of the Court.
New Yorkers well understood, Wirt said, that New Jersey "has no
hope for success but before the present judges of the Supreme Court."
But with several visibly aging justices on the high bench, change that
did not favor New Jersey lay ahead. As Wirt put it, "every probability
is in favor of a states' rights chief justice, ere long." Such a change in
personnel, long promised by President Jackson, "must inevitablylead to
the dismission of our bill, by the denial of the jurisdiction of the
court. '32
Wirt emphasized that he was simply being realistic. The Court was
at this time closely divided, and two of its leading nationalists could
depart the bench at any time. They were certain to be replaced by
states' rights jurists appointed by Andrew Jackson. Chief Justice
Marshall, seventy-seven years old and in uncertain health, talked
periodically about retirement. Another nationalist, Justice William
Johnson, was visibly failing. If either man resigned or died before the
New York-New Jersey case was decided, Wirt expected a Jacksonian
Democrat from Virginia, Philip P. Barbour, "or some other anti-court
partisan" to be appointed. Then, Wirt observed, "the last spark of
hope w[oul]d be extinguished in that quarter. New Jersey w[oul]d then
have to take arms against the giant state-and if it came to that issue,
may they prove to be the Heaven directed arms of David."33 New
Jersey's most practical option was to settle out of court, said Wirt.
Marcy's conciliatory tone in his recent annual message had sent the
right signal. It would be foolish for New Jersey to reject this overture
out of simple pride. Act now, he counseled, while there was a chance to
do so.

32

Wirt to Southard, Jan. 11, 1833, ibid. A year earlier, following New York's
request for more time to prepare its case, Wirt had written to his co-counsel Samuel
Southard that such "delay is full of danger." Wirt added that the complexion of the
Court could change to NewJersey's disadvantage. Wirt to Southard, Feb. 8, 1832, ibid.
33
Wirt to Southard, Jan. 11, 1833, ibid. On Marshall's health and outlook in
1832, see Leonard Baker, John Marshall. A Life in Law (New York 1974), 742, 746750, 764. Johnson's skein of physical ailments, beginning in 1831 and culminating in
his death following an operation in early 1835, is treated in White, The Marshall
Court, 343. Yet another Supreme Court judge, Henry Baldwin, was mentally ill, and
there was speculation about his future on the Court; ibid., 194n., 299. For an
overview of Andrew Jackson's commitment to reshaping the federal judiciary in a
states' rights direction, see Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents:A Political History
of Appointmentsto the SupremeCourt (2d ed., New York 1985), 94-102.

This content downloaded from 138.234.153.138 on Wed, 26 Jun 2013 11:51:46 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

210

JOURNAL

OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC

Wirt's argument resonated with Southard despite the latter's
inclination to let the Jacksonians suffer the consequences of their
ideological schizophrenia. Southard respected Wirt's opinion, feared
Wirt's predictions might come true, and in the end, believed that
settling this long-standing dispute, promptly, made more sense than
risking everything by putting hopes in a continued nationalist majority
on the Supreme Court. At the same time, New Jersey Jacksonians
understood that continuing their lawsuit could only lend moral support
to the nullificationists and fracture their party.34
In view of the Jacksonians' quandary over states' rights, Southard
had more leverage to ease tensions with New York, and he took
advantage of it. Within days of receiving Marcy's letter, Southard
penned a cautiously optimistic response, reminding New York that it
had to approach negotiations with a true compromising spirit or
progress would be impossible. Specifically, Southard noted that the
central issue to be resolved remained the eastern boundary, and in
particular New Jersey's insistence on a line in the middle of all waters
between the states.35
By late February, each state had passed measures authorizing yet
another formal boundary negotiation. Commissioners were appointed,
and when they met during the late summer of 1833, they quickly
reached a compromise resembling New Jersey's fallback position of
1828. Specifically, the nautical boundary between the two states was set
in the middle of the waters between them. New York retained its
jurisdiction over Barlow's and Ellis Islands; New Jersey would
over all wharves, docks and
maintain exclusive jurisdiction
improvements on its own shores; New Jersey would repudiate its
claims to Staten Island; the two states were to have equal rights on the

34 Unlike the
tepid response to President Jackson's nullification proclamation
among New York Jacksonians, most Jersey Democrats applauded the president and
chided Southard when he would not fully endorse Jackson's constitutional theory.
See Birkner, Southard, 139-140; and Herbert Ershkowitz, The Origin of the Whig and
DemocraticParties: NewJersey Politics, 1820-1837 (Washington, D.C. 1982), 162.
35
Southard's reply to Marcy is not in his papers at Princeton University;
presumably it followed the lines of his positive private response to Benjamin F.
Butler, Jan. 9, 1833, Southard Papers. See also Theodore Frelinghuysen to
Southard, Feb. 10, 1833, and Southard to William L. Marcy, Feb. 26, 1833, ibid.
Southard's appointment of commissioners was one of his last acts as governor, since
he resigned in late February, barely two months into his term as governor, to take a
seat in the United States Senate.
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under specific

circumstances.36

The essential reasonableness of the settlement was reflected in the
lack of complaint or bragging on either side. Several New Jersey
partisans grumbled that the case should have been carried to
conclusion before the Supreme Court, but the general attitude
expressed was relief. In New York, Governor Marcy's annual message
in 1834 offered a terse endorsement of the settlement, arguing that it
was "compatible with our honor and our interest." 37 Both state
legislatures promptly ratified the agreement, as did the United States
Congress. A long friction between New York and New Jersey was now
eased.
Suspension of the lawsuit with New Jersey in early 1833, like the
delicately contrived settlement Van Buren had encouraged in the
aftermath of Marshall's judgment in Worcesterv. Georgia,simplified the
Jackson administration's position in the nullification crisis. Jackson
could now more readily seek congressional authority to use force
against South Carolina without being embarrassed by the existence of a

36

Acts of the Fifty Eighth GeneralAssemblyof the State of New Jersey, 2nd Sitting

(Trenton, N. J. 1834), 118-121. Marcy wrote to Southard's replacement as
governor, Elias Seeley, seeking support for the appointment of Benjamin Butler as a
boundary commissioner and was evidently told this would be acceptable. See Marcy
to "Governor of New Jersey," Mar. 2, 1833, William L. Marcy Papers (Library of
Congress). Correspondence between the New York governor and other boundary
commissioners can be found in Marcy to A. Jay, Mar. 5, 1833, and Henry Seymour
to Marcy, Mar. 14, 1833, ibid. These letters suggest no agenda beyond reaching a
satisfactory compromise. Background materials on the dates of the meetings of the
commissioners are in James Parker's memo, "Of my attendance as a Commissioner
to Settle the Line Between New York & New Jersey," James Parker Papers (Special
Collections Department, Rutgers University Library, New Brunswick). On the
exchange of official documents confirming the compact, see Peter Vroom to James
Parker, Feb. 10, 1834, ibid.; James Parker to Peter Vroom, Mar. 7, 1834 and
Vroom to William D. Marcy, Mar. 10, 1834, Peter D. Vroom Papers (Rare Book
and Manuscript Library, Columbia University). The final folder in the Philhower
Collection Box, marked "Vroom-Wall-Rhea-Trenton
Militia" (Rutgers University
Library), contains a draft of Vroom's letter to President Andrew Jackson, Mar. 20,
1834, enclosing a copy of the agreement between New York and New Jersey.
37
Lincoln, comp., MessagesFrom the Governors, 1823-1842, 442. Examples of
letters from leading New Jersey political figures emphasizing the benefits of fighting
the case in Court include Lewis Condict to Southard, Jan. 21, 1833, and Theodore
Frelinghuysen to Southard, Jan. 11, 1833, Southard Papers. Benjamin F. Butler,
who served on the boundary commission of 1833, privately pronounced the
settlement "good & right." See Butler to Harriet Butler, Sept. 18, 1833, Butler
Family Papers (Firestone Library).
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controversy between two important states and another branch of the
federal government.38 To be sure, the dragon of nullification was not
destroyed, but neither was it triumphant. With the canny and
constructive intervention of Henry Clay, a true compromise was
forged, offering something important to each of the antagonists.39 Not
least important, the Jacksonian coalition remained intact, South
Carolina was pacified, a moderate states' rights doctrine held sway
among Democrats, and the Marshall Court avoided any damaging
blow to its authority.
Set in this context, the New York-New Jersey boundary
controversy transcended its inherently parochial nature. Studying New
Jersey v. New York in terms of national controversies helps clarify
Martin Van Buren's sense of discomfort in the fall of 1832, following
his election as vice president. It suggests how politically sensitive and
adept John Marshall was towards the end of his tenure in office. And it
underscores the difficulties Jackson faced in holding the line against
South Carolina's challenge to federal authority. Had New York
Democrats not been positioned to support the president's stance
against nullification, pressure would have intensified for Jackson to ally
more formally with his erstwhile National Republican foes, and the
Union cause would have been even more clearly at risk.40

38

Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision," 541. Ellis, Unionat Risk, 147-156,
illuminates the New York states' rights position by describing the Regency's
confused reaction and varied response to Jackson's nullification proclamation and his
Force Bill message.
39
Harry Watson, author of the best recent overview of Jacksonian politics,
notes that the compromise of 1833 "gave substantive relief to the South, at a pace
that manufacturers could bear, and gave unionists a symbolic assertion of federal
supremacy in the Force Act." Watson, Libertyand Power, 129. For William W.
Freehling's recent reassertion that Jackson emerged triumphant in the nullification

at Bay,1776-1854(New York 1990), esp.
crisis,see TheRoadtoDisunion.Secessionists

281-286.
40 See Norman D. Brown, Daniel Websterand the Politicsof Availability(Athens
1969), 15-52; Sydney Nathans, Daniel Websterand JacksonianDemocracy(Baltimore
Daniel Websterand the Union
1973), 48-73; Maurice G. Baxter, One and Inseparable:
and the Courseof American
and
Mass.
Remini,
220-222;
Jackson
1984),
(Cambridge,
9-10, 35-37.
Democracy,
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